| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8533 |
| DP8533 Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure | |
| Massimo Morelli; Maitreesh Ghatak; Madhav Aney | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study how inefficiencies of market failure may be further amplified by political choices made by interest groups created in the inefficient market. We take an occupational choice framework, where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In our model, market failure due to unobservability of talent endogenously creates a class structure that affects voting on institutional reform. In contrast to the world without market failure where the electorate unanimously vote in favour of surplus maximising institutional reform, we find that the preferences of these classes are often aligned in ways that creates a tension between surplus maximising and politically feasible institutional reforms. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Occupational choice Adverse selection Property rights Asset liquidation Political failure Market failure |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8533 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537367 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Massimo Morelli,Maitreesh Ghatak,Madhav Aney. DP8533 Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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