| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8552 |
| DP8552 Fiscal Union Consensus Design under the Risk of Autarky | |
| Massimo Morelli; José Tavares; Jaime Luque | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-08-01 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Inspired by the current debate over the future of the monetary union in Europe, this paper provides a simple model for the determination of the conditions of survival of the common good, which requires the creation of an effective fiscal union. We highlight the importance of institutional design and varying decision weights for the enlargement of the space for consensus. Our model deepens the discussion of economic risk and political risk in fiscal federalism, and highlights the related roles of country heterogeneity and institutional design in enlarging the scope for cross country fiscal agreements. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Fiscal union Uncertainty Autarky Consensus Voting weights Heterogeneous countries |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8552 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537385 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Massimo Morelli,José Tavares,Jaime Luque. DP8552 Fiscal Union Consensus Design under the Risk of Autarky. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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