| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP8509
|
| DP8509 Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Noisy Outputs |
| Aner Sela; Ella Segev
|
| 发表日期 | 2011-08-23
|
| 出版年 | 2011
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We study a sequential all-pay auction with two contestants who are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. In the model, contestant 1 (the first mover) exerts an effort in the first period which translates into an observable output but with some noise, and contestant 2 (the second mover) observes this noisy output. Then, contestant 2 exerts an effort in the second period, and wins the contest if her output is larger than or equal to the observed noisy output of contestant 1; otherwise, contestant 1 wins. We study two variations of this model where contestant 1 either knows or does not know the realization of the noise before she chooses her effort. Contestant 2 does not know the realization of the noise in both variations. For both variations, we characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium and investigate the effect of a random noise on the expected highest effort in this contest. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Noisy outputs
Sequential contests
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8509
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537387
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Aner Sela,Ella Segev. DP8509 Sequential All-Pay Auctions with Noisy Outputs. 2011.
|
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