全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP8561 Policymakers' Horizon and Trade Reforms: The Protectionist Effect of Elections

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP8561
	DP8561 Policymakers' Horizon and Trade Reforms: The Protectionist Effect of Elections
	Maurizio Zanardi; Giovanni Facchini; Paola Conconi
发表日期	2011-09-01
出版年	2011
语种	英语
摘要	This paper shows that electoral incentives deter politicians from supporting trade liberalization. We focus on all major trade bills introduced since the early 1970s in the U.S. Congress, in which House and Senate members serve respectively two- and six-year terms and one third of senators face elections every two years. We show that senators are more likely to support trade liberalization than House representatives. However, this result does not hold for the last generation of senators, who face elections at the same time as House members, suggesting that inter-cameral differences are driven by term length. Considering senators alone, we show that the last generation is more protectionist than the previous two. This result holds both when comparing different individuals voting on the same bill and the same individual voting on different bills. It is also pervasive: even representatives of export constituencies, in which a majority of voters should gain from trade liberalization, become more protectionist at the end of their terms. Inter-generational differences disappear only for senators who hold safe seats or are retiring. Our findings suggest that re-election motives lead legislators to pander toward the interests of protectionist voters.
主题	International Trade and Regional Economics
关键词	Election proximity Term length Trade reforms
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp8561
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537398
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Maurizio Zanardi,Giovanni Facchini,Paola Conconi. DP8561 Policymakers' Horizon and Trade Reforms: The Protectionist Effect of Elections. 2011.