| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8587 |
| DP8587 Delegated Activism and Disclosure | |
| Amil Dasgupta; Konstantinos Zachariadis | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Mutual funds are significant blockholders in many corporations. Concerns that funds vote in a pro-management manner to garner lucrative pensions contracts led the SEC to mandate the disclosure of proxy votes. We present a model of mutual fund voting in the presence of potential business ties. We characterize the limits of delegated activism by mutual funds pre- and post-disclosure and show that disclosure is not a panacea: for some proposals disclosure hurts activism. The desirability of disclosure also depends on the distribution of business ties amongst mutual funds. We provide support for existing empirical findings and generate new testable implications. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Corporate governance Activist investors Mutual funds Delegated portfolio management |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8587 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537424 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Amil Dasgupta,Konstantinos Zachariadis. DP8587 Delegated Activism and Disclosure. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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