| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8595 |
| DP8595 Weak Governments and Trade Agreements | |
| Marcelo Olarreaga; Jean-Louis Arcand; Laura Zoratto | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The recent theoretical literature on the determinants of trade agreements has stressed the importance of political gains, such as credibility, as a rationale for trade agreements. The empirical literature, however, has lagged behind in the estimation of the economic gains or losses associated with these politically motivated trade agreements. This paper fills that gap by providing estimates of the economic impact of politically and economically motivated trade agreements. We find that credibility gains play a role in increasing the probability of two countries signing an agreement. Moreover, agreements with a stronger political motivation are more trade creating than agreements that are signed for pure market access / economic reasons, and the value for the government of solving its time inconsistency problems through trade agreements is estimated at an average of 1.8% of GDP, which compares quite well with the traditional estimates of the economic gains from trade. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Credibility Political economy Trade agreements |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8595 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537432 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marcelo Olarreaga,Jean-Louis Arcand,Laura Zoratto. DP8595 Weak Governments and Trade Agreements. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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