| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8603 |
| DP8603 Complementing Bagehot: Illiquidity and insolvency resolution | |
| Sylvester Eijffinger; Rob Nijskens | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-10-01 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | During the recent financial crisis, central banks have provided liquidity and governments have set up rescue programmes to restore confidence and stability, often against the LLR principle advocated by Bagehot. Using a model of a systemic bank suffering from liquidity shocks, we find that the unregulated bank keeps too much liquidity and monitors too little. A central bank can alleviate the liquidity problem, but induces moral hazard. Therefore, we introduce an additional authority that is able to bail out the bank either by injecting capital at a fixed return or by receiving an equity claim. This authority faces a trade-off: demanding a fixed premium increases investment but worsens moral hazard. Request for an equity claim by the fiscal authority reduces excessive risk taking at the expense of investment. This resembles the current situation on financial markets, in which banks take less risk but also provide less credit to the economy |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Bailout Bank regulation Capital Lender of last resort Liquidity |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8603 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537440 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sylvester Eijffinger,Rob Nijskens. DP8603 Complementing Bagehot: Illiquidity and insolvency resolution. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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