| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8629 |
| DP8629 The Benefits of Sequential Screening | |
| Roland Strausz; Daniel Krähmer | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-11-01 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper considers the canonical sequential screening model and shows that when the agent has an ex post outside option, the principal does not benefit from eliciting the agent's information sequentially. Unlike in the standard model without ex post outside options, the optimal contract is static and conditions only on the agent's aggregate final information. The benefits of sequential screening in the standard model are therefore due to relaxed participation rather than relaxed incentive compatibility constraints. We argue that in the presence of ex post participation constraints, the classical, local approach fails to identify binding incentive constraints and develop a novel, inductive procedure to do so instead. The result extends to the multi-agent version of the problem. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Dynamic mechanism design Mirrlees approach Participation constraints Sequential screening |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8629 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537466 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roland Strausz,Daniel Krähmer. DP8629 The Benefits of Sequential Screening. 2011. |
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