G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8668
DP8668 Sovereign debt, government myopia, and the financial sector
Raghuram Rajan; Viral Acharya
发表日期2011-11-01
出版年2011
语种英语
摘要What determines the sustainability of sovereign debt? In this paper, we develop a model where myopic governments seek electoral popularity but can nevertheless commit credibly to service external debt. They do not default when they are poor because they would lose access to debt markets and be forced to reduce spending; they do not default when they become rich because of the adverse consequences to the domestic financial sector. Interestingly, the more myopic a government, the greater the advantage it sees in borrowing, and therefore the less likely it will be to default (in contrast to models where sovereigns repay because they are concerned about their long term reputation). More myopic governments are also likely to tax in a more distortionary way, and create more dependencies between the domestic financial sector and government debt that raise the costs of default. We use the model to explain recent experiences in sovereign debt markets.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Ability to pay Willingness to pay Sovereign default Political economy
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8668
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537505
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Raghuram Rajan,Viral Acharya. DP8668 Sovereign debt, government myopia, and the financial sector. 2011.
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