| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
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| 来源ID | DP8668
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| DP8668 Sovereign debt, government myopia, and the financial sector |
| Raghuram Rajan; Viral Acharya
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| 发表日期 | 2011-11-01
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| 出版年 | 2011
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| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | What determines the sustainability of sovereign debt? In this paper, we develop a model where myopic governments seek electoral popularity but can nevertheless commit credibly to service external debt. They do not default when they are poor because they would lose access to debt markets and be forced to reduce spending; they do not default when they become rich because of the adverse consequences to the domestic financial sector. Interestingly, the more myopic a government, the greater the advantage it sees in borrowing, and therefore the less likely it will be to default (in contrast to models where sovereigns repay because they are concerned about their long term reputation). More myopic governments are also likely to tax in a more distortionary way, and create more dependencies between the domestic financial sector and government debt that raise the costs of default. We use the model to explain recent experiences in sovereign debt markets. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
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| 关键词 | Ability to pay
Willingness to pay
Sovereign default
Political economy
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| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8668
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| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537505
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Raghuram Rajan,Viral Acharya. DP8668 Sovereign debt, government myopia, and the financial sector. 2011.
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