| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8670 |
| DP8670 Experimentation in Two-Sided Markets | |
| Sven Rady; Martin Peitz; Piers Trepper | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-11-01 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study optimal experimentation by a monopolistic platform in a two-sided market framework. The platform provider faces uncertainty about the strength of the externality each side is exerting on the other. It maximizes the expected present value of its profit stream in a continuous-time infinite-horizon framework by setting participation fees or quantities on both sides. We show that a price-setting platform provider sets a fee lower than the myopically optimal level on at least one side of the market, and on both sides if the two externalities are of approximately equal strength. If the externality that one side exerts is sufficiently weaker than the externality it experiences, the optimal fee on this side exceeds the myopically optimal level. We obtain analogous results for expected prices when the platform provider chooses quantities. While the optimal policy does not admit closed-form representations in general, we identify special cases in which the undiscounted limit of the model can be solved in closed form. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Bayesian learning Monopoly experimentation Network effects Optimal control Two-sided market |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8670 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537507 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sven Rady,Martin Peitz,Piers Trepper. DP8670 Experimentation in Two-Sided Markets. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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