| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8704 |
| DP8704 Procurement with specialized firms | |
| jan boone; Christoph Schottmüller | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-12-01 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes optimal procurement mechanisms in a setting where the procurement agency has incomplete information concerning the firms' cost functions and cares about quality as well as price. Low type firms are cheaper than high type firms in providing low quality but more expensive when providing high quality. Hence, each type is specialized in a certain quality level. We show that this specialization leads to a bunching of types on profits, i.e. a range of firms with different cost functions receives zero profits and therefore no informational rents. If first best welfare is monotone in the efficiency parameter, the optimal mechanism can be implemented by a simple auction. If first best welfare is U-shaped in type, the optimal mechanism is not efficient in the sense that types providing a lower second best welfare win against types providing a higher second best welfare. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Deregulation Procurement Specialization |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8704 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537540 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | jan boone,Christoph Schottmüller. DP8704 Procurement with specialized firms. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
