| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8726 |
| DP8726 The Dracula Effect: Voter Information and Trade Policy | |
| Giacomo Ponzetto; Maria Petrova; Ruben Enikolopov | |
| 发表日期 | 2011-12-01 |
| 出版年 | 2011 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Trade barriers cause substantial deadweight losses, yet they enjoy surprising voter support. We develop an electoral model that accounts for this puzzling popularity of protectionism. Producers have incentives to acquire information about their own sector, while consumers do not. As a result, trade barriers are popular because they are disproportionately noticed by their beneficiaries. In equilibrium, politicians give every sector positive protection. This protectionist bias induces Pareto inefficiency if public information is too limited. Our model predicts a Dracula Effect: trade policy for an industry is less protectionist when public awareness of it is greater. We test this prediction empirically across U.S. manufacturing industries, exploiting the timing of industrial accidents relative to other newsworthy events as a source of exogenous variation in media coverage of each sector. As predicted by our theory, industries whose accidents occur on slow news days subsequently enjoy lower non-tariff barriers. |
| 主题 | International Trade and Regional Economics |
| 关键词 | Dracula effect Imperfect information Media coverage Pareto inefficiency Protectionism Voters |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8726 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537561 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giacomo Ponzetto,Maria Petrova,Ruben Enikolopov. DP8726 The Dracula Effect: Voter Information and Trade Policy. 2011. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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