| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8729 |
| DP8729 A Theory of Income Smoothing When Insiders Know More Than Outsiders | |
| Bart Lambrecht; Viral Acharya | |
| 发表日期 | 2012 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a setting in which insiders have information about income that outside shareholders do not, but property rights ensure that outside shareholders can enforce a fair payout. To avoid intervention, insiders report income consistent with outsiders' expectations based on publicly available information rather than true income, resulting in an observed income and payout process that adjust partially and over time towards a target. Insiders under-invest in production and effort so as not to unduly raise outsiders' expectations about future income, a problem that is more severe the smaller is the inside ownership and results in an 'outside equity Laffer curve'. A disclosure environment with adequate quality of independent auditing mitigates the problem, implying that accounting quality can enhance investments, size of public stock markets and economic growth. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Payout policy Asymmetric information Under-investment Accounting quality Measurement error |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8729 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537565 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bart Lambrecht,Viral Acharya. DP8729 A Theory of Income Smoothing When Insiders Know More Than Outsiders. 2012. |
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