| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8731 |
| DP8731 Innovation, Spillovers and Venture Capital Contracts | |
| Roberta Dessi | |
| 发表日期 | 2012 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Innovative start-ups and venture capitalists are highly clustered, benefiting from localized spillovers: Silicon Valley is perhaps the best example. There is also substantial geographical variation in venture capital contracts: California contracts are more 'incomplete'. This paper explores the economic link between these observations. In the presence of significant spillovers, it becomes optimal for an innovative start-up and its financier to adopt contracts with fewer contingencies: these contracts maximize their ability to extract (part of) the surplus they generate through positive spillovers. This relaxes ex-ante financing constraints and makes it possible to induce higher innovative effort. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Innovation Spillovers Venture capital Incomplete contracts |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8731 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537567 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roberta Dessi. DP8731 Innovation, Spillovers and Venture Capital Contracts. 2012. |
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