G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8731
DP8731 Innovation, Spillovers and Venture Capital Contracts
Roberta Dessi
发表日期2012
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要Innovative start-ups and venture capitalists are highly clustered, benefiting from localized spillovers: Silicon Valley is perhaps the best example. There is also substantial geographical variation in venture capital contracts: California contracts are more 'incomplete'. This paper explores the economic link between these observations. In the presence of significant spillovers, it becomes optimal for an innovative start-up and its financier to adopt contracts with fewer contingencies: these contracts maximize their ability to extract (part of) the surplus they generate through positive spillovers. This relaxes ex-ante financing constraints and makes it possible to induce higher innovative effort.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Innovation Spillovers Venture capital Incomplete contracts
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8731
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537567
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Roberta Dessi. DP8731 Innovation, Spillovers and Venture Capital Contracts. 2012.
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