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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP8731 |
DP8731 Innovation, Spillovers and Venture Capital Contracts | |
Roberta Dessi | |
发表日期 | 2012 |
出版年 | 2012 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Innovative start-ups and venture capitalists are highly clustered, benefiting from localized spillovers: Silicon Valley is perhaps the best example. There is also substantial geographical variation in venture capital contracts: California contracts are more 'incomplete'. This paper explores the economic link between these observations. In the presence of significant spillovers, it becomes optimal for an innovative start-up and its financier to adopt contracts with fewer contingencies: these contracts maximize their ability to extract (part of) the surplus they generate through positive spillovers. This relaxes ex-ante financing constraints and makes it possible to induce higher innovative effort. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Innovation Spillovers Venture capital Incomplete contracts |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8731 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537567 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roberta Dessi. DP8731 Innovation, Spillovers and Venture Capital Contracts. 2012. |
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