| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8738 |
| DP8738 Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt | |
| Fabrizio Zilibotti; Kjetil Storesletten; Zheng Michael Song | |
| 发表日期 | 2012 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper proposes a dynamic politico-economic theory of fiscal policy in a world comprising a set of small open economies, whose driving force is the intergenerational conflict over debt, taxes, and public goods. Subsequent generations of voters choose fiscal policy through repeated elections. The presence of young voters induces fiscal discipline, i.e., low taxes and low debt accumulation. The paper characterizes the Markov-perfect equilibrium of the voting game in each economy, as well as the stationary equilibrium debt distribution and interest rate of the world economy. The equilibrium can reproduce some salient features of fiscal policy in modern economies. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Fiscal discipline Fiscal policy General equilibrium Government debt High debt in greece and italy Intergenerational conflict Markov equilibrium Political economy Public goods Repeated voting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8738 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537574 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fabrizio Zilibotti,Kjetil Storesletten,Zheng Michael Song. DP8738 Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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