G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8762
DP8762 Exclusive dealing as a barrier to entry? Evidence from automobiles
Frank Verboven
发表日期2012
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要Exclusive dealing contracts between manufacturers and retailers force new entrants to set up their own costly dealer networks to enter the market. We ask whether such contracts may act as an entry barrier, and provide an empirical analysis of the European car market. We first estimate a demand model with product and spatial differentiation, and quantify the role of a dense distribution network in explaining the car manufacturers' market shares. We then perform policy counterfactuals to assess the profit incentives and entry-deterring effects of exclusive dealing. We find that there are no individual incentives to maintain exclusive dealing, but there can be a collective incentive by the industry as a whole, even absent efficiencies. Furthermore, a ban on exclusive dealing would shift market shares from the larger European firms to the smaller entrants. More importantly, consumers would gain substantially, mainly because of the increased spatial availability and less so because of intensified price competition. Our findings suggest that the European Commission's recent decision to facilitate exclusive dealing in the car market may not have been warranted.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Automotive industry Exclusive dealing Foreclosure Vertical restraints
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8762
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537598
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Frank Verboven. DP8762 Exclusive dealing as a barrier to entry? Evidence from automobiles. 2012.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Frank Verboven]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Frank Verboven]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Frank Verboven]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。