G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8774
DP8774 Smart Buyers
Mike Burkart; Samuel Lee
发表日期2012
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要In many bilateral transactions, the seller fears being underpaid because its outside option is better known to the buyer. We rationalize a variety of observed contracts as solutions to such smart buyer problems. The key to these solutions is to grant the seller upside participation. In contrast, the lemons problem calls for offering the buyer downside protection. Yet in either case, the seller (buyer) receives a convex (concave) claim. Thus, contracts commonly associated with the lemons problem can equally well be manifestations of the smart buyer problem. Nevertheless, the information asymmetries have opposite cross-sectional implications. To avoid underestimating the empirical relevance of adverse selection problems, it is therefore critical to properly identify the underlying information asymmetries in the data.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Asymmetric information Bilateral trade Cash-equity offers Commissions Contingent value rights Debt-equity swaps Lemons problem Royalties
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8774
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537610
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Mike Burkart,Samuel Lee. DP8774 Smart Buyers. 2012.
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