| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8776 |
| DP8776 Team Incentives: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment | |
| Oriana Bandiera; Iwan Barankay; Imran Rasul | |
| 发表日期 | 2012 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Many organizations rely on teamwork, and yet field evidence on the impacts of team-based incentives remains scarce. Compared to individual incentives, team incentives can affect productivity by changing both workers? effort and team composition. We present evidence from a field experiment designed to evaluate the impact of rank incentives and tournaments on the productivity and composition of teams. Strengthening incentives, either through rankings or tournaments, makes workers more likely to form teams with others of similar ability instead of with their friends. Introducing rank incentives however reduces average productivity by 14%, whereas introducing a tournament increases it by 24%. Both effects are heterogeneous: rank incentives only reduce the productivity of teams at the bottom of the productivity distribution, and monetary prize tournaments only increase the productivity of teams at the top. We interpret these results through a theoretical framework that makes precise when the provision of team-based incentives crowds out the productivity enhancing effect of social connections under team production. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Rank incentives Team-based incentives Teams Tournaments |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8776 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537612 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Oriana Bandiera,Iwan Barankay,Imran Rasul. DP8776 Team Incentives: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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