G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8790
DP8790 Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes
Alberto Chong; Dean Karlan; Ana De La O
发表日期2012
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要Does information about rampant political corruption increase electoral participation and the support for challenger parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if there is consistent evidence suggesting that voters punish corrupt incumbents, it is unclear whether this translates into increased support for challengers and higher political participation. We provide experimental evidence that information about copious corruption not only decreases incumbent support in local elections in Mexico, but also decreases voter turnout, challengers' votes, and erodes voters' identification with the party of the corrupt incumbent. Our results suggest that while flows of information are necessary, they may be insufficient to improve political accountability, since voters may respond to information by withdrawing from the political process. We conclude with a discussion of the institutional contexts that could allow increased access to information to promote government accountability.
主题Development Economics
关键词Accountability Corruption Elections Information Voting
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8790
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537625
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alberto Chong,Dean Karlan,Ana De La O. DP8790 Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes. 2012.
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