| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8792 |
| DP8792 Robust Capital Regulation | |
| Anjan Thakor; Viral Acharya; Hamid Mehran | |
| 发表日期 | 2012 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We address the following questions concerning bank capital: why are banks so highly levered, what are the consequences of this leverage for the economy as a whole, and how can robust capital regulation be designed to restrict bank leverage to levels that do not generate excessive systemic risk? Bank leverage choices are a delicate balancing act: credit discipline argues for more leverage so that creditors have adequate skin in the game, while balance-sheet opacity and ease of asset substitution by bank managers and shareholders argue for less. Disturbing this balance are regulatory safety nets that promote ex post financial stability but also create perverse incentives for banks to engage in correlated asset choices ex ante and thus hold little equity capital. We discuss how a two-tier capital requirement can cope with these distortions: a core capital requirement like existing capital requirements, and a special capital account that must be invested in Treasuries, accrues to the bank?s shareholders as long as the bank is solvent, and accrues to the regulators (rather than the creditors) if the bank fails. The special capital account requirement ensures creditors have skin in the game and also provides the second margin of safety in the calculation of capital adequacy--a buffer for the regulator?s own "model risk" in calculations of needed capital buffers. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Capital requirements Leverage Systemic risk Market discipline Model risk |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8792 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537627 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anjan Thakor,Viral Acharya,Hamid Mehran. DP8792 Robust Capital Regulation. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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