| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
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| 规范类型 | 论文
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| 来源ID | DP8794
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| DP8794 Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers |
| Mike Burkart; Konrad Raff
|
| 发表日期 | 2012-02-01
|
| 出版年 | 2012
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by offering acquisition opportunities to successful managers. This allows firms to reduce performance-based compensation and can rationalize loss-making acquisitions. At the same time, takeovers remain a substitute for board dismissal in the replacement of poorly performing managers. The joint impact of the two mechanisms on managerial turnover is, however, multi-faceted: In firms with strong boards, turnover and performance-based pay are non-monotonic in the intensity of the takeover threat. In firms with weak boards, turnover (performance-based pay) increases (decreases) with the intensity of the takeover threat. When choosing its acquisition policy and the quality of its board, each firm ignores the adverse effect on other firms' acquisition opportunities and takeover threat. As a result, the takeover market is not sufficiently liquid and too few takeovers occur. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
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| 关键词 | Board interference
Ceo turnover
Compensation
Takeover
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8794
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| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537636
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Mike Burkart,Konrad Raff. DP8794 Performance Pay, CEO Dismissal, and the Dual Role of Takeovers. 2012.
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