| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8816 |
| DP8816 Competition for traders and risk | |
| jan boone; Gijsbert Zwart | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The financial crisis has been attributed partly to perverse incentives for traders at banks and has led policy makers to propose regulation of banks' remuneration packages. We explain why poor incentives for traders cannot be fully resolved by only regulating the bank's top executives, and why direct intervention in trader compensation is called for. We present a model with both trader moral hazard and adverse selection on trader abilities. We demonstrate that as competition on the labour market for traders intensifies, banks optimally offer top traders contracts inducing them to take more risk, even if banks fully internalize the costs of negative outcomes. In this way, banks can reduce the surplus they have to offer to lower ability traders. In addition, we find that increasing banks' capital requirements does not unambiguously lead to reduced risk-taking by their top traders. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Financial institutions Imperfect competition Optimal contracts Remuneration policy Risk |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8816 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537652 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | jan boone,Gijsbert Zwart. DP8816 Competition for traders and risk. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [jan boone]的文章 |
| [Gijsbert Zwart]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [jan boone]的文章 |
| [Gijsbert Zwart]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [jan boone]的文章 |
| [Gijsbert Zwart]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
