| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8832 |
| DP8832 Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Thresholds | |
| Francesco Caselli; Massimo Morelli; Ines Moreno de Barreda | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-02-01 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Much literature on political behavior treats politicians as motivated by reelection, choosing actions to signal their types to voters. We identify two novel implications of models in which signalling incentives are important. First, because incumbents only care about clearing a reelection hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for reelection. This generates a skew distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the probability of election. Second, voters can exploit the signalling behavior of politicians by precommitting to a higher threshold for signals received. Raising the threshold discourages signalling effort by low quality politicians but encourages effort by high quality politicians, thus increasing the separation of signals and improving the selection function of an election. This precommitment has a simple institutional interpretation as a supermajority rule, requiring that incumbents exceed some fraction of votes greater than 50% to be reelected. A simple calibration suggests the average quality of US Congress members would be maximised by requiring a 57% vote share for reelection. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Incumbency advantage Signalling Sipermajority |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8832 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537668 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Francesco Caselli,Massimo Morelli,Ines Moreno de Barreda. DP8832 Signalling, Incumbency Advantage, and Optimal Reelection Thresholds. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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