| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8848 |
| DP8848 Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders | |
| Alessandra Casella; Thomas R Palfrey | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by the two group leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market. The theory has strong predictions. In both cases, trading falls short of full efficiency, but for opposite reasons: with group leaders, the minority wins too rarely; with market trades, the minority wins too often. As a result, with group leaders, vote trading improves over no-trade; with market trades, vote trading can be welfare reducing. All predictions are strongly supported by experimental results. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Bargaining Competitive equilibrium Experiments Votes market Voting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8848 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537694 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Casella,Thomas R Palfrey. DP8848 Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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