G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8848
DP8848 Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders
Alessandra Casella; Thomas R Palfrey
发表日期2012-02-23
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by the two group leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market. The theory has strong predictions. In both cases, trading falls short of full efficiency, but for opposite reasons: with group leaders, the minority wins too rarely; with market trades, the minority wins too often. As a result, with group leaders, vote trading improves over no-trade; with market trades, vote trading can be welfare reducing. All predictions are strongly supported by experimental results.
主题Public Economics
关键词Bargaining Competitive equilibrium Experiments Votes market Voting
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8848
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537694
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alessandra Casella,Thomas R Palfrey. DP8848 Vote Trading With and Without Party Leaders. 2012.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Alessandra Casella]的文章
[Thomas R Palfrey]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Alessandra Casella]的文章
[Thomas R Palfrey]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Alessandra Casella]的文章
[Thomas R Palfrey]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。