| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8852 |
| DP8852 Bank Bonuses and Bail-outs | |
| Isabel Schnabel; Hendrik Hakenes | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper shows that bonus contracts may arise endogenously as a response to agency problems within banks, and analyzes how compensation schemes change in reaction to anticipated bail-outs. If there is a risk-shifting problem, bail-out expectations lead to steeper bonus schemes and even more risk-taking. If there is an effort problem, the compensation scheme becomes flatter and effort decreases. If both types of agency problems are present, a sufficiently large increase in bail-out perceptions makes it optimal for a welfare-maximizing regulator to impose caps on bank bonuses. In contrast, raising managers? liability is counterproductive. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Bank bail-outs Bank management compensation Bonus payments Limited and unlimited liability Risk-shifting Underinvestment |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8852 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537697 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Isabel Schnabel,Hendrik Hakenes. DP8852 Bank Bonuses and Bail-outs. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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