G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8855
DP8855 A Model of Equilibrium Institutions
Bernardo Guimaraes; Kevin Sheedy
发表日期2012-02-23
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要Institutions that serve the interests of an elite are often cited as an important reason for poor economic performance. This paper builds a model of institutions that allocate resources and power to maximize the payoff of an elite, but where any group that exerts sufficient fighting effort can launch a rebellion that destroys the existing institutions. The rebels are then able to establish new institutions as a new elite, which will similarly face threats of rebellion. The paper analyses the economic consequences of the institutions that emerge as the equilibrium of this struggle for power. High levels of economic activity depend on protecting private property from expropriation, but the model predicts this can only be achieved if power is not as concentrated as the elite would like it to be, ex post. Power sharing endogenously enables the elite to act as a government committed to property rights, which would otherwise be time inconsistent. But sharing power entails sharing rents, so in equilibrium power is too concentrated, leading to inefficiently low investment.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Institutions Political economy Power struggle Property rights Time inconsistency
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8855
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537700
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Bernardo Guimaraes,Kevin Sheedy. DP8855 A Model of Equilibrium Institutions. 2012.
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