| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8855 |
| DP8855 A Model of Equilibrium Institutions | |
| Bernardo Guimaraes; Kevin Sheedy | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Institutions that serve the interests of an elite are often cited as an important reason for poor economic performance. This paper builds a model of institutions that allocate resources and power to maximize the payoff of an elite, but where any group that exerts sufficient fighting effort can launch a rebellion that destroys the existing institutions. The rebels are then able to establish new institutions as a new elite, which will similarly face threats of rebellion. The paper analyses the economic consequences of the institutions that emerge as the equilibrium of this struggle for power. High levels of economic activity depend on protecting private property from expropriation, but the model predicts this can only be achieved if power is not as concentrated as the elite would like it to be, ex post. Power sharing endogenously enables the elite to act as a government committed to property rights, which would otherwise be time inconsistent. But sharing power entails sharing rents, so in equilibrium power is too concentrated, leading to inefficiently low investment. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Institutions Political economy Power struggle Property rights Time inconsistency |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8855 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537700 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bernardo Guimaraes,Kevin Sheedy. DP8855 A Model of Equilibrium Institutions. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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