全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP8856 When the Baby Cries at Night: Uninformed and Hurried Buyers in Non-Competitive Markets

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP8856
	DP8856 When the Baby Cries at Night: Uninformed and Hurried Buyers in Non-Competitive Markets
	Andrea Ichino; Giacomo Calzolari; Francesco Manaresi
发表日期	2012-02-23
出版年	2012
语种	英语
摘要	We study the entrance in a retail market of consumers who are less elastic because of hurriedness and lack of information. Theory predicts that firms react by increasing prices to expand surplus extraction, but this effect weakens as market competition increases. High frequency data from Italian pharmacies confirm these predictions. Monthly variation in the number of newborns at the city level generates exogenous changes in the number of less elastic buyers (the parents) who consume a basket of hygiene products demanded by more experienced and elastic consumers as well. We estimate that the number of newborns has a positive effect on the equilibrium price even if marginal costs are decreasing. We exploit exogenous variation in market competition generated by the Italian legislation concerning how many pharmacies should operate in a city as a function of the existing population. Using a Regression Discontinuity design we find that an increase in competition has a significant and negative effect on the capacity of sellers to extract surplus from less elastic buyers.
主题	Industrial Organization ; Public Economics
关键词	Consumer's information Demand elasticity Pharmacies Price competition Regression discontinuity
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp8856
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537701
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Andrea Ichino,Giacomo Calzolari,Francesco Manaresi. DP8856 When the Baby Cries at Night: Uninformed and Hurried Buyers in Non-Competitive Markets. 2012.