G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8857
DP8857 You Can Pick Your Friends, But You Need to Watch Them: Loan Screening and Enforcement in a Referrals Field Experiment
Jonathan Zinman; Dean Karlan; Gharad Bryan
发表日期2012-02-23
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要We examine a randomized trial that allows separate identification of peer screening and enforcement of credit contracts. A South African microlender offered half its clients a bonus for referring a friend who repaid a loan. For the remaining clients, the bonus was conditional on loan approval. After approval, the repayment incentive was removed from half the referrers in the first group and added for half those in the second. We find large enforcement effects, a $12 (100 Rand) incentive reduced default by 10 percentage points from a base of 20%. In contrast, we find no evidence of screening.
主题Development Economics
关键词Credit market failures Information asymmetries Peer networks Social capital Social Networks
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8857
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537702
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jonathan Zinman,Dean Karlan,Gharad Bryan. DP8857 You Can Pick Your Friends, But You Need to Watch Them: Loan Screening and Enforcement in a Referrals Field Experiment. 2012.
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