| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8857 |
| DP8857 You Can Pick Your Friends, But You Need to Watch Them: Loan Screening and Enforcement in a Referrals Field Experiment | |
| Jonathan Zinman; Dean Karlan; Gharad Bryan | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-02-23 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine a randomized trial that allows separate identification of peer screening and enforcement of credit contracts. A South African microlender offered half its clients a bonus for referring a friend who repaid a loan. For the remaining clients, the bonus was conditional on loan approval. After approval, the repayment incentive was removed from half the referrers in the first group and added for half those in the second. We find large enforcement effects, a $12 (100 Rand) incentive reduced default by 10 percentage points from a base of 20%. In contrast, we find no evidence of screening. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Credit market failures Information asymmetries Peer networks Social capital Social Networks |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8857 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537702 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jonathan Zinman,Dean Karlan,Gharad Bryan. DP8857 You Can Pick Your Friends, But You Need to Watch Them: Loan Screening and Enforcement in a Referrals Field Experiment. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
