| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8877 |
| DP8877 Flexibility and Collusion with Imperfect Monitoring | |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo; Jan Potters; Maria Bigoni | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Flexibility - the ability to react swiftly to others' choices - facilitates collusion by reducing gains from defection before opponents react. Under imperfect monitoring, however, flexibility may also hinder collusion by inducing punishment after too few noisy signals. The combination of these forces predicts a non-monotonic relationship between flexibility and collusion. To test this subtle prediction we implement in the laboratory an indefinitely repeated Cournot game with noisy price information and vary how long players have to wait before changing output. We find that (i) the facilitating role of flexibility is lost under imperfect monitoring, and (ii) with learning, collusion unravels with low or high flexibility, but not with intermediate flexibility. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Collusion Cooperation Flexibility Imperfect monitoring Oligopoly Repeated games. |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8877 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537713 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giancarlo Spagnolo,Jan Potters,Maria Bigoni. DP8877 Flexibility and Collusion with Imperfect Monitoring. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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