| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8878 |
| DP8878 Can the Failing Firm Defense Rule be Counterproductive? | |
| Helder Vasconcelos | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the role of the failing firm defense (FFD) concept in merger control in a Cournot setting where: (i) endogenous mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains; and (ii) mergers must be submitted to an Antitrust Authority which might require partial divestiture for approval. It is shown that when the FFD concept is available in merger control, firms can strategically embark on a merger which makes other firms fail and then buy over the exiting outsider firm(s), leading to complete monopolization of the industry. This in turn implies that, in some circumstances, the consumers'-surplus-maximizing market structure cannot be achieved if the FFD concept is available, whereas it would be achieved if the FFD concept were ruled out. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Efficiency gains Endogenous mergers Failing firm defense Merger review |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8878 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537714 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Helder Vasconcelos. DP8878 Can the Failing Firm Defense Rule be Counterproductive?. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Helder Vasconcelos]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Helder Vasconcelos]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Helder Vasconcelos]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
