G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP8879
DP8879 What Explains the Rise in CEO Pay in Germany? A Panel Data Analysis for 1977-2009
Dalia Marin; Francesca Fabbri
发表日期2012-03-01
出版年2012
语种英语
摘要The compensation of executive board members in Germany has become a highly controversial topic since Vodafone's hostile takeover of Mannesmann in 2000 and it is again in the spotlight since the outbreak of the financial crisis of 2009. Based on unique panel data evidence of the 500 largest firms in Germany in the period 1977-2009 we test two prominent hypothesis in the literature on executive pay: the manager power hypothesis and the efficient pay hypothesis. We find support for the manager power hypothesis for Germany as executives tend to be rewarded when the sector is doing well rather than the firm they work for. We reject, however, the efficient pay hypothesis as CEO pay and the demand for managers increases in Germany in difficult times when the typical firm size shrinks. We find further that domestic and global competition for managers has contributed to the rise in executive pay in Germany. Lastly, we show that CEOs in the banking sector are provided with incentives for performance and that the great recession of 2009 acted as a disciplining device on CEO pay in Germany.
主题Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; International Trade and Regional Economics ; Labour Economics
关键词Manager power hypothesis Efficient pay hypothesis Domestic and global competition for managers Ceo pay in banks Ceo pay in the financial crisis
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp8879
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537715
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Dalia Marin,Francesca Fabbri. DP8879 What Explains the Rise in CEO Pay in Germany? A Panel Data Analysis for 1977-2009. 2012.
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