| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8901 |
| DP8901 Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing | |
| Nicolas Sahuguet; Nicola Persico; Edoardo Di Porto | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Deterrence of illegal activities is frequently carried out by many atomistic auditors (tax auditors, law enforcement agents, etc.). Not much is known either normatively about the best way to incentivize atomistic auditors, nor positively about what these incentives actually look like in real world organizations. This paper focuses almost exclusively on the positive question. It proposes a game-theoretic model of decentralized deterrence and an empirical test, based on the equilibrium of the model, to identify the incentives of individual auditors. In the special (but important) case of tax enforcement, the paper fully characterizes the equilibrium of a strategic auditing game and provides a method to calibrate its parameters based on audit data. Applying the model and method to Italian auditing data provides ?proof of concept?: the methods are practical and tractable. We are able to provide an estimate of tax evasion based on (non-random) audit data alone. Counterfactual simulation of the model quantifies the costs and benefits of alternative auditing policies. We compare decentralized enforcement with a counterfactual commitment policy, and compute the loss from the former. Thus we are able to quantify the costs of decentralizing enforcement. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Audits Deterrence Tax evasion |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8901 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537731 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicolas Sahuguet,Nicola Persico,Edoardo Di Porto. DP8901 Decentralized Deterrence, with an Application to Labor Tax Auditing. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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