| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8905 |
| DP8905 Seeking Alpha: Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent | |
| Marco Pagano; Viral Acharya; Paolo Volpin | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a model of labor market equilibrium in which managers are risk-averse, managerial talent (?alpha?) is scarce, and firms seek alpha, that is, compete for this talent. When managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient long-term compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent and insures low-quality managers. In contrast, when managers can move across firms, high-quality managers can fully extract the rents arising from their skill, which prevents firms from providing co-insurance among their employees. In anticipation, risk-averse managers may churn across firms before their performance is fully learnt and thereby prevent their efficient choice of projects. The result is excessive risk-taking with pay for short-term performance and build up of long-term risks. We conclude with analysis of policies to address the resulting inefficiency in firms' compensation. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Short-termism Executive compensation Managerial talent Managerial turnover |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8905 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537735 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marco Pagano,Viral Acharya,Paolo Volpin. DP8905 Seeking Alpha: Excess Risk Taking and Competition for Managerial Talent. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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