| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8910 |
| DP8910 Backwards Integration and Strategic Delegation | |
| Konrad O Stahl; Lars-Hendrik Röller | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the effects of one or more downstream firms? acquisition of pure cash flow rights in an efficient upstream supplier when firms compete in prices in both markets. With such an acquisition, downstream firms internalize the effects of their actions on that supplier?s and thus, their rivals? sales. Double marginalization is enhanced. While vertical integration would lead to decreasing downstream prices, passive backwards ownership in the efficient supplier leads to increasing downstream prices and is more profitable, as long as competition is sufficiently intensive. Downstream acquirers strategically abstain from vertical control, inducing the efficient upstream firm to commit to a high price. Forbidding upstream price discrimination is then pro-competitive. All results are sustained when upstream suppliers are allowed to charge two part tariffs. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Common agency Double marginalization Partial cross ownership Strategic delegation Vertical integration |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8910 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537740 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Konrad O Stahl,Lars-Hendrik Röller. DP8910 Backwards Integration and Strategic Delegation. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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