| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8921 |
| DP8921 The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment | |
| Uwe Sunde; Andreas Roider; Florian Englmaier | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-03-01 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Incentive schemes affect performance and priorities of agents but, in reality, they can be complicated even for simple tasks. We analyze the effects of the salience of incentives in a team production setting where the principal has an interest in quantity and quality of output. We use data from a controlled field experiment that changed the communication of the incentive system without changing the incentive system. The results indicate that salience of incentives itself is statistically and economically important for performance. We find that higher salience of incentives for quantity increases quantity, reduces quality, and increases in-pocket income of team managers. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Attention Communication Field experiments Incentives Salience |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8921 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537751 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Uwe Sunde,Andreas Roider,Florian Englmaier. DP8921 The Role of Salience in Performance Schemes: Evidence from a Field Experiment. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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