| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP8936
|
| DP8936 Competition for Managers and Corporate Governance |
| Viral Acharya; Paolo Volpin
|
| 发表日期 | 2012-04-01
|
| 出版年 | 2012
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We propose a model in which better governance incentivizes managers to perform better and thus saves on the cost of providing pay for performance. However, when managerial talent is scarce, firms' competition to attract better managers reduces an individual firm's incentives to invest in corporate governance. In equilibrium, better managers end up at firms with weaker governance, and conversely, better-governed firms have lower-quality managers. Consistent with these implications, in a sample of US firms, we show that (i) better CEOs are matched to firms with weaker corporate governance and more so in industries with stronger competition for managers, and, (ii) corporate governance is more likely to change when there is CEO turnover, with governance weakening when the incoming CEO is better than the departing one. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
|
| 关键词 | Corporate governance
Competition for managers
Ceo duality.
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8936
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537774
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Viral Acharya,Paolo Volpin. DP8936 Competition for Managers and Corporate Governance. 2012.
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