| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8949 |
| DP8949 Multi-Stage Sequential All-Pay Auctions | |
| Aner Sela; Ella Segev | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-04-01 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the sub-game perfect equilibrium of these multi-stage sequential all-pay contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants, their types, and their order on the expected highest effort. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | All-pay auctions Sequential contests |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8949 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537787 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Aner Sela,Ella Segev. DP8949 Multi-Stage Sequential All-Pay Auctions. 2012. |
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