| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8977 |
| DP8977 Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard | |
| Philippe De Donder; David Bardey | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-05-21 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model where a genetic test reveals whether an individual has a low or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease this probability. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers, and taking the test is associated to a discrimination risk. We study the individual decisions to take the test and to undertake the prevention effort as a function of the effort cost and of its efficiency. If effort is observable by insurers, agents undertake the test only if the effort cost is neither too large nor too low. If the effort cost is not observable by insurers, moral hazard increases the value of the test if the effort cost is low. We offer several policy recommendations, from the optimal breadth of the tests to policies to do away with the discrimination risk. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Discrimination risk Informational value of test Personalized medecine |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8977 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537796 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Philippe De Donder,David Bardey. DP8977 Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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