| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8982 |
| DP8982 Vertical Exclusion with Endogenous Competiton Externalities | |
| Massimo Motta; Stephen Hansen | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-05-21 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a vertical market in which downstream firms have private information about their productivity and compete for consumers, an upstream firm posts public bilateral contracts. When downstream firms are risk-neutral without wealth constraints, the upstream firm offers the input to all retailers. When they are sufficiently risk averse it sells to one, thereby eliminating externalities among downstream firms that necessitate the payment of risk premia. By similar reasoning exclusion is also optimal with downstream wealth constraints. Thus exclusion arises when contracts are fully observable and downstream firms are ex ante symmetric. The result is robust to a number of extensions. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Adverse selection Exclusive contracts Limited liability Risk |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8982 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537801 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Massimo Motta,Stephen Hansen. DP8982 Vertical Exclusion with Endogenous Competiton Externalities. 2012. |
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