| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8960 |
| DP8960 A Theory of Political Entrenchment | |
| Gilles Saint-Paul; Davide Ticchi; Andrea Vindigni | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-05-23 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a theory of endogenous political entrenchment in a simple two-party dynamic model of income redistribution with probabilistic voting. A partially self-interested left-wing party may implement (entrenchment) policies reducing the income of its own constituency, the lower class, in order to consolidate its future political power. Such policies increase the net gain that low-skill agents obtain from income redistribution, which only the Left (but not the Right) can credibly commit to provide, and therefore may help offsetting a potential future aggregate ideological shock averse to the left-wing party. We demonstrate that political entrenchmen by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high and that low-skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies. We also discuss the case where the left-wing party may have the incentive to ex-ante commit to not pursue entrenchment policies once in power. Finally, we show that, in a more general framework, the entrenchment policies can be implemented also by the right-wing party. The comparative statics analyzes the effects of state capacity, a positive bias of voters for one party and income inequality on the incentives of the incumbent party to pursue entrenchment policies. The importance of our theory for constitutionally legislated term limits is also discussed. The theory sheds light on why left-wing parties or politicians often support liberal immigration policies of unskilled workers, are sometime in favor of free trade with less developed economies and of globalization more generally, or fail to reform plainly |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Checks and balances Constituencies Inefficient redistribution Inequality Political entrenchment Political rents State fiscal capacity |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8960 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537812 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Gilles Saint-Paul,Davide Ticchi,Andrea Vindigni. DP8960 A Theory of Political Entrenchment. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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