| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8961 |
| DP8961 Prudential Policy for Peggers | |
| Martín Uribe; Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-05-23 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper shows that in a small open economy model with downward nominal wage rigidity pegging the nominal exchange rate creates a negative pecuniary externality. This peg-induced externality is shown to cause unemployment, overborrowing, and depressed levels of consumption. The paper characterizes the optimal capital control policy and shows that it is prudential in nature. For it restricts capital inflows in good times and subsidizes external borrowing in bad times. Under plausible calibrations of the model, this type of macro prudential policy is shown to lower the average unemployment rate by 10 percentage points, reduce average external debt by more than 50 percent, and increase welfare by over 7 percent of consumption per period. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Capital controls Currency pegs Downward wage rigidity Pecuniary externality |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8961 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537813 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martín Uribe,Stephanie Schmitt-Grohé. DP8961 Prudential Policy for Peggers. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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