| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP8989
|
| DP8989 Bargaining failures and merger policy |
| Ramon Caminal; Roberto Burguet
|
| 发表日期 | 2012-05-27
|
| 出版年 | 2012
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | In this paper we study the optimal ex-ante merger policy in a model where merger proposals are the result of strategic bargaining among alternative candidates. We allow for firm asymmetries and, in particular, we emphasize the fact that potential synergies generated by a merger may vary substantially depending on the identity of the participating firms. The model demonstrates that, under some circumstances, relatively inefficient mergers may take place. That is, a particular merger may materialize despite the existence of an alternative merger capable of generating higher social surplus and even higher profits. Such bargaining failures have important implications for the ex-ante optimal merger policy. We show that a more stringent policy than the ex-post optimal reduces the scope of these bargaining failures and raises expected consumer surplus. We use a bargaining model that is flexible, in the sense that its strategic structure does not place any exogenous restriction on the dendogenous likelihood of feasible mergers. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Bargaining
Endogenous mergers
Merger policy
Synergies
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8989
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537827
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Ramon Caminal,Roberto Burguet. DP8989 Bargaining failures and merger policy. 2012.
|
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