| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP8992 |
| DP8992 Buying to Sell: Private Equity Buyouts and Industrial Restructuring | |
| Lars Persson; Pehr-Johan Norbäck; Joacim Tåg | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-05-27 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We investigate how temporary ownership by private equity firms affects industry structure, competition and welfare. Temporary ownership leads to strong investment incentives because equilibrium resale prices are determined partly by buyers' incentives to block rivals from obtaining assets. These strong incentives benefit consumers, but harm rivals in the industry. Evaluating optimal antitrust policy, we point out that an active private equity market can aid antitrust authorities by triggering welfare enhancing mergers and by preventing concentration in the industry. By spreading costs of specializing in restructuring over multiple markets, private equity firms have stronger incentives than incumbents to invest in acquiring specialized restructuring skills. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Antitrust Competition policy Leveraged buyouts Mergers and acquisitions Private equity Temporary ownership |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp8992 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537830 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lars Persson,Pehr-Johan Norbäck,Joacim Tåg. DP8992 Buying to Sell: Private Equity Buyouts and Industrial Restructuring. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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