| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9000 |
| DP9000 Stock Market Tournaments | |
| Kathy Yuan; Emre Ozdenoren | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-06-03 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We propose a new theory of suboptimal risk-taking based on contractual externalities. We examine an industry with a continuum of firms. Each firm's manager exerts costly hidden effort The productivity of effort is subject to systematic shocks. Firms' stock prices reflect their performance relative to the industry average. In this setting, stock-based incentives cause complementarities in managerial effort choices. Externalities arise because shareholders do not internalize the impact of their incentive provision on the average effort. During booms, they over-incentivise managers, triggering a rat-race in effort exertion, resulting in excessive risk relative to the second-best. The opposite occurs during busts. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Contractual externalities Excessive risk-taking Insufficient risk-taking Stock-based incentives |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9000 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537838 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kathy Yuan,Emre Ozdenoren. DP9000 Stock Market Tournaments. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Kathy Yuan]的文章 |
| [Emre Ozdenoren]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Kathy Yuan]的文章 |
| [Emre Ozdenoren]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Kathy Yuan]的文章 |
| [Emre Ozdenoren]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
