| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9002 |
| DP9002 Trust and Deterrence | |
| Giancarlo Spagnolo; Sven-Olof Fridolfsson; Chloé Le Coq; Maria Bigoni | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-06-03 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper presents results from a laboratory experiment on the channels through which different law enforcement strategies deter cartel formation. With leniency policies offering immunity to the first reporting party a high fine is the main determinant of deterrence, having a strong effect even when the probability of exogenous detection is zero. Deterrence appears then mainly driven by 'distrust', the fear of partners deviating and reporting. Absent leniency, the probability of detection and the expected fine matter the most, and low fines are exploited to punish defections. The results appear relevant to several other crimes sharing cartels' strategic features, including corruption and financial fraud. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Antitrust Betrayal Cartels Collusion Distrust Fines Leniency Whistleblowers |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9002 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537840 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giancarlo Spagnolo,Sven-Olof Fridolfsson,Chloé Le Coq,et al. DP9002 Trust and Deterrence. 2012. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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