| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9004 |
| DP9004 A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (Revised Version) | |
| Andrew Newman | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-06-03 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We present a perfectly-competitive model of firm boundary decisions and study their interplay with product demand, technology, and welfare. Integration is pri- vately costly but is effective at coordinating production decisions; non-integration is less costly, but coordinates relatively poorly. Output price influences the choice of ownership structure: integration increases with the price level. At the same time, own- ership affects output, since integration is more productive than non-integration. For a generic set of demand functions, the result is heterogeneity of ownership and perfor- mance among ex-ante identical enterprises. The price mechanism transmutes demand shifts into industry-wide re-organizations and generates external effects from techno- logical shocks: productivity changes in some firms may induce ownership changes in others. If the enterprise managers have full title to its revenues, market equilibrium ownership structures are second-best efficient. When managers have less than full revenue claims, equilibrium can be inefficient, with too little integration. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Decision rights Incomplete contracting Industrial organization Integration Ownership |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9004 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537842 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Newman. DP9004 A Price Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (Revised Version). 2012. |
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