| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP9018
|
| DP9018 Organizing the Global Value Chain |
| Pol Antras; Davin Chor
|
| 发表日期 | 2012-06-24
|
| 出版年 | 2012
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We develop a property-rights model of the firm in which production entails a continuum of uniquely sequenced stages. In each stage, a final-good producer contracts with a distinct supplier for the procurement of a customized stage-specific component. Our model yields a sharp characterization for the optimal allocation of ownership rights along the value chain. We show that the incentive to integrate suppliers varies systematically with the relative position (upstream versus downstream) at which the supplier enters the production line. Furthermore, the nature of the relationship between integration and "downstreamness" depends crucially on the elasticity of demand faced by the final-good producer. Our model readily accommodates various sources of asymmetry across final-good producers and across suppliers within a production line, and we show how it can be taken to the data with international trade statistics. Combining data from the U.S. Census Bureau's Related Party Trade database and estimates of U.S. import demand elasticities from Broda and Weinstein (2006), we find empirical evidence broadly supportive of our key predictions. In the process, we develop two novel measures of the average position of an industry in the value chain, which we construct using U.S. Input-Output Tables. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
; International Trade and Regional Economics
|
| 关键词 | Contractual frictions
Downstreamness
Global value chain
Intrafirm trade
Property rights
Sequential production
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9018
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537854
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Pol Antras,Davin Chor. DP9018 Organizing the Global Value Chain. 2012.
|
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