| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP9048
|
| DP9048 Managing licensing in a market for technology |
| Andrea Fosfuri; Thomas Rønde
|
| 发表日期 | 2012-07-08
|
| 出版年 | 2012
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Over the last decade, companies have paid greater attention to the management of their intellectual assets. We build a model that helps understand how licensing activity should be organized within large corporations. More specifically, we compare decentralization?where the business unit using the technology makes licensing decisions?to centralized licensing. The business unit has superior information about licensing opportunities but may not have the appropriate incentives because its rewards depend upon product market performance. If licensing is decentralized, the business unit forgoes valuable licensing opportunities since the rewards for licensing are (optimally) weaker than those for product market profits. This distortion is stronger when production-based incentives are more powerful, making centralization more attractive. Growth of technology markets favors centralization and drives higher licensing rates. Our model conforms to the existing evidence that reports heterogeneity across firms in both licensing propensity and organization of licensing. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization
|
| 关键词 | Licensing
Markets for technology
Organization design
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9048
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537882
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Andrea Fosfuri,Thomas Rønde. DP9048 Managing licensing in a market for technology. 2012.
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