| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9050 |
| DP9050 The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-07-08 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | An inventor can invest research effort to come up with an innovation. Once an innovation is made, a contract is negotiated and unobservable effort must be exerted to develop a product. In the absence of liability constraints, the inventor's investment incentives are increasing in his bargaining power. Yet, given limited liability, overinvestments may occur and the inventor's investment incentives may be decreasing in his bargaining power. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Hold-up problem Incomplete contracts Limited liability Research and development |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9050 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537884 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz. DP9050 The hold-up problem, innovations, and limited liability. 2012. |
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