| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP9054 |
| DP9054 Tax Contracts and Elections | |
| Hans Gersbach; Maik Schneider | |
| 发表日期 | 2012-07-15 |
| 出版年 | 2012 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts, a novel instrument, on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government and voters may behave strategically. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks when in office. A government raises taxes for both purposes. We show that tax contracts yield moderate policies and lead to lower perks by avoiding the formation of grand coalitions in order to win government. Moreover, in polarized societies they unambiguously improve the welfare of the median voter. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Elections Government formation Political contracts Tax promise |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp9054 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/537888 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach,Maik Schneider. DP9054 Tax Contracts and Elections. 2012. |
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